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I.
Kierkegaard is nearly universally acknowledged among philosophers as an 
interesting, if sometimes tendentious thinker. He is not so universally accorded 
the distinction of philosopher. That there is philosophical content in his work 
is readily admitted, yet this is only incidental, it is said, to his primary import 
as a religious thinker. Such commentators can point to numerous places 
throughout Kierkegaard’s authorship where he makes it unquestionably clear 
that his overwhelming concern, both personally and qua author, is with the 
problem of becoming a Christian. This problem, according to Kierkegaard, is 
one of fidus not intellectus and one of the greatest weaknesses within the 
professed community of faith was their all too willing acceptance of the 
philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. Thus, it could seem easily concluded, 
Kierkegaard’s authorship is fundamentally non-philosophical, his spurious 
critique of certain theological applications of philosophy aside. His profundity 
lies in his deft analysis of that significant range of human experience sur­
rounding personal faith but this -  and on his own ground -  is outside the 
purview of reason and is therefore, ipso facto, outside philosophy. Briefly 
stated this viewpoint finds Kierkegaard a religious irrationalist, if not 
voluntarist, who constituted faith and reason as separate and immisible 
domains, the first of ultimate concern and the latter of only minor interest.
As a religious thinker concerned with the thus formulated problem of 
Christian faith, it is similarly sometimes said that Kierkegaard’s ethics are 
private and aesthetic and that he therefore has little or nothing to contribute
to the arena of social and political philosophy.1 While I would argue against 
this conclusion, it can be substantiated with reference to Kierkegaard’s texts. 
As John Wild, in an essay which generally praises Kierkegaard as a profound 
ethicist and penetrating social and cultural critic, points out:
His attack on mass standardization and his passionate concern for the individual 
person often led him toward an existential solipsism which seemed to deny the 
possibility of inter-subjective communication. He sometimes confused his attack 
on Hegelian rationalism with an attack on human reason itself.2
Wild has correctly indicated a problem in the Kierkegaardian authorship, but 
to conclude that this is the main thrust of his position, as some others have 
done, represents a fundamental misunderstanding of Kierkegaard. In some 
cases this misunderstanding can be attributed simply to an incomplete reading 
of Kierkegaard, but it seems to me more often to be the result of the lack 
of a systematic method by which one correlates and evaluates the many 
different kinds of texts one encounters in the Kierkegaardian canon.
The problem of an incomplete reading is fully understandable, but not 
excusable. Kierkegaard’s writings in the present definitive Danish editions 
fill thirty-five volumes, and this is not absolutely complete.3 Furthermore 
since Danish is not a world language translations assume critical importance 
and the whole authorship is not translated into English, French or German, 
or a combination of them. Yet one is not required to read every single text of
1 Bolin, Torsten, Søren Kierkegaards etiske åskådning med sårskild hansyn til begreppet 
’den enskilde\ academic dissertation, Stockholm, 1918, passim.
Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man, Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1947, p. 40. 
Mackey, Louis, ’’The Loss o f  the W orld in Kierkegaard's Ethics,” The Review of Meta­
physics, X V , 1 9 6 1 -6 2 , pp. 6 0 2 -6 2 0 .
M oore, Stanley R., "R eligion as the True Humanism: Reflections on Kierkegaard’s Social 
Philosophy,” Journal of The American Academy of Religion, X X X V II, 1969, pp. 1 5 -25 . 
N iebuhr, H. Richard, Christ and Culture, Harper, N ew  York, 1951, p. 80.
Ruttenbeck, W alther, Sôren Kierkegaard: Der Christliche D enker und Sein Werk, 
Trowitsch und Sohn, Berlin, 1929, p. 134.
2 W ild , John, ’’Kierkegaard and Contemporary Existentialist Philosophy,” in Johnson, 
H . A. and N iels Thulstrup, A. Kierkegaard Critique, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1962, 
pp. 2 2 -3 9 . (Hereafter Critique).
3 There are some om m isions from the Papirer, although these should not be of any decisive 
importance. There are also marginal notations made by Kierkegaard in som e of the 
books in his personal library which he used most often. Such comments m ight serve to 
annotate the developm ent of Kierkegaard’s critical thinking. In this respect see: D ewey, 
Bradley R., "Kierkegaard’s Blue Testament,” Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge.
Kierkegaard’s before he can be understood. Indeed in several cases it seems 
that if the author had read just one additional major work, available in a 
fully competent English translation, Works of Love, Kierkegaard would not 
have been accused of such serious deficiencies in social ethics.
Kierkegaard is often read incompletely in good faith, by students with no 
dogmatic viewpoint, who wish to honestly interpret him. Their errors along 
with those of their more assiduous colleagues are most often due to the absence 
of an appropriate method. I propose here to suggest the main features of a 
systematic method appropriate to the study of Kierkegaard. As a direct 
corollary I hope to tentatively indicate that such a methodological reading of 
Kierkegaard, by allowing the correct perspective on his work, would tend to 
dissolve those criticisms which find him an anti-intellectual, non-political, 
religious solipsist.
II.
The proper method of approaching Kierkegaard has been much discussed 
and what I suggest on these pages will consist mostly of summary and syn­
thesis. Interest in the question is certainly provoked by Kierkegaard’s own 
consciousness of the peculiar status of his work. He clearly recognized his own 
position as a reaction-philosopher, although he sometimes had doubts about 
its worthiness, and defined his own role as that of a corrective.
This well known fact, that Kierkegaard produced his enormous authorship 
specifically to provide what he judged to be an essentially needed corrective, 
is the key principle to be remembered when reading any of the published 
works (SV). They were published by Kierkegaard for one particular reason: 
to stand as a corrective. The same cannot be said of the Papirer simply because 
they were not made public by Kierkegaard. Perhaps he would have made 
some of them public, had he only time to ’polish’ the manuscript. One thinks 
in particular of ”De Omnibus Dubitandum Est” (Pap. IV B 1) in this respect. 
But the irreversible fact is that they were not, and rather than trying to piece 
together evidence as to Kierkegaard’s motives in not having published them, 
a task which unavoidably involves some second-guessing, one should apply the
methodological principle that the unpublished (by Kierkegaard) Papirer should 
not be understood as corrective in the same sense as the published works.
If this sounds either arbitrary or insignificant we need only reflect a moment 
on the content of the idea, corrective. For something to be a corrective it must 
necessarily be bound to the public domain, as a polemical assertion against 
either public actions or statements. This involves the centrality of verifiable 
facts: this was either said or done and needs to be corrected. If there were not 
something factual, concrete, what possible content could a corrective have? 
A reflection on one’s own inner experiences cannot, of itself, be presented as 
a corrective. The Papirer contain without question entries which would other­
wise be described as corrective, the polemic tone perhaps reaches its sharpest 
edge therein, except that Kierkegaard chose that they should remain private. 
He did not wish to submit them to the market place of ideas, perhaps partly 
because of purely personal and contingent factors, but primarily they were 
not the corrective he wished to apply. This is to say that as regards the Papirer 
we do not have the author’s assurance that they fit into the context he felt 
duty-bound to challenge and correct. I must hasten to add that this on no 
account diminishes the significance of the Papirer for understanding the 
philosophy of Kierkegaard, but only stipulates that the SV and Papirer can 
not be read as one continuous authorship. Their great value in a systematic 
endeavor is that they often illuminate otherwise obscure passages.
Thus our first consideration when reading Kierkegaard is that he is a 
polemic writer through and through. In recognizing this we can avoid the 
errors of some who have dismissed Kierkegaard’s highly topical and perhaps 
overstated later polemical writings as the diatribe of a disturbed man or the 
hateful expletive of a morbid individual. Kierkegaard’s polemics must be read 
against the background of his entire published autorship as phases integral 
to the give and take of applying a public corrective. The now no longer 
prevalent reading of 0ieblikket as anti-Christian by some, and as the result 
of insanity by others (depending only upon one’s personal emotions toward 
the specific themes discussed) is a clear example of this error. The error is 
simply a taking out of context, but the problem, difficult enough in 1855 
Copenhagen and more than doubly so today, is finding the context. For it is 
not enough to say that the context of any given work is the published author­
ship as a whole, or at least that portion which preceeded it, but, precisely 
because every work is polemic, every work has referents outside of itself which 
form its nucleus. These referents are carried forward weaving a maze more 
difficult than most to untangle. When Kierkegaard asks, e. g., ”Was Bishop 
Mynster a ’witness to the truth/ one of ’the genuine witnesses to the truth’ -  
is this the truth?” his answer is more than he gives in the article.4 When 
Kierkegaard says ’’You who read this must surely know what is to be under­
stood by a witness to the truth/’5 it is a tacit reference to the numerous 
discussions of truth and discipleship already in his published authorship, each 
with referents outside the authorship, and the description which follows is 
only a poetic-homiletic summary of what he had developed at great length 
otherwise.
Within the article itself are specific references to events outside the author­
ship, Professor Martensen’s address and the preaching career of Bishop Myn­
ster being the two which have occasioned the response, each being a public 
example of what Kierkegaard felt needed correcting. In a sense the article 
resembles a roadsign errected by Kierkegaard, pointing in one direction toward 
events in the public community and in the other toward his own previously 
articulated thoughts. Without attempting to further demonstrate this may I 
assert that this double-pointing relationship may be seen in each of Kierke­
gaard’s published works. Of-course in most cases the context is removed from 
daily-life Copenhagen. Philosophical Fragments, e. g., is a polemical response 
to German speculative idealism. A first methodological principle must then 
be to discover the coherence between the work in question and the other 
published works on the one hand and the concrete events in the public domain 
on the other. I will call this the polemical context and it is the most significant 
factor for understanding Kierkegaard.
The polemical context represents one aspect of the historical antecedents 
which stand related to each of Kierkegaard’s works. Professor Thulstrup has 
divided these into special and general historical antecedents.6 The polemical 
context as I have defined it corresponds roughly to the special historical
4 SV X IV , p. 11. (A ll references to SV are to the second edition).
5 Ibid., p. 12.
6 Thulstrup, N iels, ”A  Com plex o f Problems Called Kierkegaard,” in  Critique, pp. 2 8 6 -2 9 6 .
antecedents.7 We shall now consider the general historical antecedents. Briefly 
stated they comprise the history of philosophy and Christianity. No one 
contests that everything that Kierkegaard said (or did, but that is outside our 
sphere of interest) must be understood in terms of its relation to Christianity. 
There are, however, numerous problems in delineating just what that relation 
was. There are questions about the orthodoxy of his doctrine, whether he was 
more Lutheran or Roman Catholic, etc. I find that most of these questions 
have little more than parochial-historical interest and may futhermore tend 
to obfuscate the radical kind of Christianity Kierkegaard was trying to present. 
This is to say that as a methodological principle one needn’t be involved with 
the detailed antecedents of Kierkegaard’s Christology (except when they form 
the polemical context, e. g. much of Martensen’s work), but recognize it as an 
attempt to present a pure Christianity which rests on the Bible and in 
particular the New Testament.
With the history of philosophy the case is quite different. He is related in 
numerous ways, influenced by a great many thinkers. His knowledge of the 
history of philosophy was large but uneven. He grasped onto various positions 
and thinkers which appealed to him as vigorously as he attacked those which 
he felt jeopardized the individual’s way to the truth. Most briefly and dog­
matically stated Kierkegaard’s relation to the history of philosophy is that he 
took up the philosophical standpoint of Socrates and polemically addressed 
it to Hegelianism. This statement is an obvious oversimplification, but it 
suggests the passion and intimacy with which Kierkegaard was involved with 
the history of philosophy and, because it points to a movement which persisted 
throughout his authorship, suggests the basis of a methodological principle. 
The ’’Preliminary Remark” to For Self Examination8 provides in a religious 
discourse published under Kierkegaard’s own name a confession of his own
7 It is not important enough to quarrel over terms, but it seems to m e that the polem ical 
context is so overw helm ingly significant in understanding Kierkegaard, precisely because 
it is so polem ical, that it should be given special attention. T he polem ical context also 
stands apart from the private biographical information which also would come under the 
rubric of special historical antecedent. For exam ple in the article, ’’W as Bishop Mynster 
a W itness to the Truth?” Kierkegaard m entions his personal relation to Mynster and 
indicates that he w ould have spoken out sooner except for this relationship. W h ile  
interesting, this fact is apart from the essential spirit o f the polem ic and does nothing to 
clarify it.
8 SV X II, p. 337.
dedication to the ideals of Socrates. There are numerous other similar references 
to Socrates. Kierkegaard tried to conduct his own enterprise in a manner as 
much like Socrates as possible, commensurate with the differences inherent 
in his own historical situation and his Christianity. One can compare Kierke­
gaard’s polemic with Socrates’ role as gadfly, Kierkegaard’s indirect method 
with Socrates’ dialogue, and the model of that single individual (hiin Enkelte) 
with Socrates himself. These themes are as closely inter-related in the author­
ship of Kierkegaard as in the life of Socrates. Together they form part of the 
philosophical foundation for Kierkegaard’s polemic. Consequently a 
philosophical understanding of Kierkegaard requires familiarity with his own 
understanding of Socrates, an abstruse and often ambiguous topic. However 
because of its centrality to the problem of approaching Kierkegaard 
philosophically I shall attempt a few remarks on this theme shortly.
But first, under the topic of the general historical antecedents -  the history 
of philosophy, I should like to suggest what I feel is a striking parallel to the 
Kierkegaardian enterprise found in the history of philosophy. This stands as 
an historical antecedent not because of its direct influence on Kierkegaard’s 
authorship (as far as I know there was none), but because it aptly characterizes 
a typical, we may say primordial, movement in the history of philosophy and 
thus at least symbolically represents what may be called, for want of a better 
name, the philosophical tradition.
The parallel I wish to draw is with Parmenides’ poem of two sections 
called ’The Way of Truth’ and ’The Way of Seeming.’ On three distinct levels 
this poem provides an instructive parallel with Kierkegaard. The first is that 
the philosopher must withdraw from the realm of ordinary discourse among 
men in order to approach the truth. His departure is absolutely requisite to 
the apprehension of philosophical modalities unrecognizable from within the 
realm of the many. Furthermore, perhaps ironically, the philosophical under­
standing achieved apart from the realm of the many is to form the basis of 
the philosopher’s relation to the many. Parmenides described the search for 
truth as an activity within the experience of private withdrawal. (The poem 
in the section ’’The Way of Truth” is a careful logical deduction but still 
replete with religious symbols, suggesting that Parmenides understood the 
search for truth as religious activity). The parallel with Kierkegaard is precise;
the withdrawal from the realm of the many because of religious concerns -  
religion being the inward apprehension of truth -, then having one’s relation 
to the many determined by the demands of truth-seeking.
This leads directly to the second level on which one finds a parallel between 
the ancient Parmenides and the pre-eminently modern Kierkegaard: both -  
and in respect of their withdrawal in the name of truth -  turn polemicist. 
The poem’s most obviously polemical remark, which may or may not have 
been partially directed toward Heraclitus, reads ”. . .  mortals knowing nothing 
wander two-headed; . . .  they were born along both deaf and blind, mazed, 
crowds with no judgement.”9 This sounds too much like statements of Kierke­
gaard about the crowd (mcengderi) to escape notice. There is also a third level 
on which Parmenides’ poem proves elucidating. This is to be found in his 
distinction between the eternal and the everlasting. Parmenides distinguished 
between time and eternity insofar as he recognized the eternal as a different 
and separate category from the everlasting. To describe something as ever­
lasting is to place it within the extendedness of time. Of something which is 
everlasting one says that it was in the past just as it is now and will continue 
to be in the future. The everlasting is a category of temporality. The eternal, 
conversely, is a concept outside of all temporal possibilities so that the 
sequential categories of past and future are completely inapplicable. This 
distinction, in someways the hallmark of ’’modern” existentialism, plays a 
significant role in Kierkegaard especially in terms of the individual’s relation 
to the temporal, public world.
The reason I have suggested this example is because I feel it suggests a 
methodological clue for understanding Kierkegaard, namely, that his vision 
is remarkably akin to the spirit of ancient philosophy. The theme of with­
drawal in ancient philosophy is not unique to Parmenides (nor is it unique 
to Kierkegaard among the moderns), but represents a bend of mind so 
fundamental that we could expect to find a kinship of spirits which goes far 
beyond the level of isolated examples between the ancient philosophers and 
Kierkegaard. Indeed this is the case. A similar parallel has been noted between 
Kierkegaard’s standpoint and Plato’s simile of the cave.
9 Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, W eidm ann, D ublin/Z iirich, 1967, Fragment
number 6.
The upward journey out of the cave is managed through dialectic, the existential 
dialectic of Kierkegaard, which once again calls the individual out of the masses 
and places him before God as an individual. And the arrival outside the cave is 
the pathos of existence’ which Kierkegaard and every authentic and prophetic 
existence must assume in relation to mass man. It is standing as an individual 
before God. Only then do the sun of the divine Agathon and the true objects of 
perception come into view.10
We may summarize the general historical antecedents as: 1) Most decisively 
New Testament Christianity, 2) the example of Socrates as an ethical indi­
vidual, dialectician (ironist) and social-political critic (gadfly), 3) the spirit 
of ancient philosophy.
A closely related question, because of its connection with Socrates, is that 
of Kierkegaard’s frequently noted method of indirect communication. Kierke­
gaard used a total of nineteen pseudonymous designations which stood in 
various relations to each other and special relation to him. He did not use 
them to hide his identity from the public but rather, in some cases, to underline 
the polemic and to establish a negative relation between himself and the 
positions presented.
So in the pseudonymous works there is not a single word which is mine, I have 
no opinion about these works except as a third person, no knowledge of their 
meaning except as a reader, not the remotest private relation to them, since such 
a thing is impossible in the case of a doubly-reflected communication.11
The different authors present different positive positions, but Kierkegaard’s 
only knowledge or opinion of these opinions is as a reader or, as in a dialogue, 
listener. The situation simulates what Kierkegaard understands the dynamic 
of a Socratic dialogue to be. In a sense he has done nothing but, ironically, he 
has been the agent which has caused the opinions to come forth. Kierkegaard, 
in other words, understands himself as ironist. Kierkegaards indirect com­
munication and irony are perhaps the most noteworthy aspects of his 
indebtedness to Socrates. In Kierkegaard’s understanding of Socrates his most 
salient feature is his irony.
10 Richter, Liselotte, ’’Kierkegaard’s Position in H is R eligious-Sociological Situation,” in  
Critique, p. 71.
11 SV VII, p. 616.
In his academic dissertation, The Concept of Irony -  With Constant 
Reference to Socrates, Kierkegaard develops the notion of Socrates conceived 
as irony, in contrast to and critique of the notion of Socrates conceived as a 
practioner of irony. If he were only a practitioner of irony his daimon would 
be false. (Socrates’ daimon is the determination which fully accounts for his 
relation to the state and the public. His relation to his own daimon are those 
inward structures of the relation of man to oracle, i, e. piety. Socrates is an 
example of the pious man’s relation to the public.) In his analysis Kierkegaard 
is interested in the actual historical Socrates and thus for his sources depends 
not only on Plato, but on Xenophon and Aristophanes as well.
Kierkegaard contends in his portrayal that Socrates’ entire life was (in 
terms of practical concerns) one of indirection, simply because he didn’t know 
anything. Socrates could not realize the good, the beautiful, or the realm of 
the eternal forms for the reason that he did not know them. Kierkegaard 
argues that Socrates had conceived infinity in this form of ignorance and that 
he must have had this conception with him everywhere. For Kierkegaard 
ignorance was not merely a technique assumed by Socrates; nor could it be if 
he conceived the infinite in this way. Socrates is most well known for his 
technique of asking questions, presumably to bring his partner in discussion 
to the realization of an underlying philosophical principle. In his analysis of 
this Kierkegaard maintains that the purpose of asking questions may be either 
speculative or ironic. If it is speculative one asks a question in order to get an 
answer that contains what the questioner is looking for. It follows that a 
skillful questioner with this purpose, by asking successive questions, could 
draw out from his respondent a ’’deep” and meaningful answer. In this way 
questioning is instructive and results in positive knowledge. The other 
possibility, according to Kierkegaard, is to ask a question with no intention 
of obtaining a satisfactory answer, but rather to use the question to remove 
apparent content and thereby leave the respondent with nothing.12 The first 
of the alternatives obviously presupposes that there is a content to be drawn 
out, the second that there is not. Kierkegaard maintained that because Socrates 
was so pervaded by irony his questions were not to discover or draw out any 
information, but rather to undermine and even destroy the position being 
12 Pap. I l l  A  7.
questioned. Kierkegaard specifically states about the two methods: ’’Now it 
was the latter method which was especially practiced by Socrates.”13 In other 
words Socrates was a negative force undermining the accepted beliefs 
including, significantly, the belief in the traditional gods.
The explanation as to why Socratic questioning was of the second type, 
and his standpoint that of negative undermining, according to Kierkegaard, 
is found in Socrates’ descriptions of himself as theoretically ignorant. Kierke­
gaard emphasized that Socrates proclaimed himself theoretically ignorant, and 
not ignorant in an empirical sense. His ignorance was his philosophical stand­
point, and was thoroughly negative. That is, Kierkegaard says, Socrates was 
ignorant of any reason (i. e. reasonable explanation) underlying things, of an 
eternal or a divine. However to stipulate as your philosophical standpoint 
your ignorance about such things is to paradoxically assert a knowledge of 
the reality of such entities.
... he knew that it was, but he did not know what it was. He was conscious of 
it, since the only thing he could predicate of it was that he knew nothing 
about it.14
But this knowledge, which might be called ironic knowledge, does not admit 
of any objective determination. Therefore Socrates does not, for example, 
objectively know the specific dieties. Kierkegaard argues that in Plato’s 
Apology Socrates’ surprise at being found guilty by such a small number of 
votes is a clear indication that he does not recognize in the state anything 
objective which could validly oppose a particular subject. Socrates, according 
to Kierkegaard, did not see anything qualitatively different about the fact 
that it was an official state decision and not simply the opinions of various 
individuals. Kierkegaard adds that in a sense the state does not even exist for 
Socrates.15 The reason the irony of Socrates causes him to reject every objective 
determination is that irony is the standpoint of the existing individual turned 
inward to seek the higher truths of subjectivity. The objective determinations 
which are rejected, Kierkegaard seems to suggest, are arbitrary values which 
arise from convention or tradition. Socrates, as genuine ironist, has recognized
i s  SV XIII, p. 140.
14 Ibid., p. 271.
15 Ibid., p. 296.
the complete relativity of such objective determinations and thus is at a 
higher level of existence. In irony the individual does not directly issue a 
polemic against the arbitrary conventions of most people, but rather 
dissimulates his superiority -  his wisdom -  and seeks a higher absolute value. 
In searching the realm of the objective determination he finds nothing of 
such a value; he seeks this value but, Kierkegaard maintains, he knows 
nothing about it. Socrates' only knowledge is his ignorance, that is his 
knowledge of nothing.
To know that one is ignorant is the beginning of wisdom, but if one knows; no 
more than this it is only a beginning. It is this knowledge which holds Socrates 
ironically aloft.16
Kierkegaard understood himself as author as standing in the same relation 
to the public as Socrates did. His understanding of objectivity is also virtually 
the same as that to which he credits Socrates. One may therefore look for 
irony, of the sort Kierkegaard attributes to Socrates, throughout the SV. 
Kierkegaard was obviously not completely and consistently an ironist, there 
are too many examples of direct, straightforward polemic to allow for that 
interpretation, but there are elements of irony in his authorship from beginning 
to end. As a methodological principle one must always be open to its 
likelihood.17
III.
I have suggested what may serve as the outline of a method for the 
systematic understanding of Kierkegaard. At the same time I hope some 
notion of the type of engagement Kierkegaard has with the public realm has been 
pointed to. It is easy to marshal citations from both SV and the Papirer to 
establish Kierkegaard's concern for social and political matters or to show
is ibid., p. 369.
17 For an interesting attempt to interpret Kierkegaard as an ironist w ho says the opposite  
of what he means see the fo llow ing analysis of Concluding Unscientific Postscript: 
A llison, Henry E., ’’Christianity and N onsense,” The Review of Metaphysics, X X , no. 3, 
1967.
the opposite, an utter lack of concern for man’s outward condition. The latter, 
however, can only be held when Kierkegaards authorship is read without 
perspective. However Kierkegaard as a writer is peculiarly susceptible of 
being misunderstood, a fact he himself appreciated.
"The corrective works confusion only when it is not held in the context of that 
to which it is a corrective."18
The problem is that which forms the context is so complex and wide ranging, 
and furthermore it is never the same.
"The next generation will need the opposite of ’the corrective’."19
i s  Pap., X I 1A, 28. 
!» Pap., X  5 A, 106.
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